Central Asian Migrants Look Beyond Russia, Yet New Destinations Carry Challenges Too

Central Asian Migrants Look Beyond Russia, Yet New Destinations Carry Challenges Too May 7, 2026 Feature By Nodira Kholmatova and Nodira Abdulloeva

A road sign in Kazakhstan. (Photo: Stephen Anthony Rohan/iStock.com)

For decades, Russia has been the primary destination for labor migrants from Central Asia. As Russia has depended on migrant labor since the early 2000s to fuel its post-Soviet economic growth, the economies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have likewise relied on migration to distribute surplus labor that their agricultural and low-productivity sectors could not absorb. The billions of dollars that migrants send back to these countries as remittances also account for significant portions of the Central Asian countries’ economies—nearly half in the case of Tajikistan.

In This Article

• Recent events involving Russia have made alternative destinations more attractive

• New migration systems are more formalized, empowering state institutions and private recruiters

• While new destinations may offer opportunities, migrants can remain vulnerable to a range of harms

Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has disrupted this order. Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the 2024 mass-casualty terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow allegedly carried out by Tajik nationals, many migrants in Russia have faced deteriorating economic conditions, substantially elevated immigration controls, and racial discrimination. For many Central Asians, these factors have created incentives to seek employment elsewhere. Meanwhile, governments—particularly those of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—have reduced their dependence on Russia, warned their nationals not to migrate there, and promoted diversification of migration channels. New destinations include the Baltic countries, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the Western Balkans, and other European countries. This process has only just begun, however, and Russia remains the leading destination for millions of migrant workers.

As the landscape is shifting to new destinations, different forms of recruitment are taking place. An increasing number of workers, for example, are migrating under bilateral intergovernmental agreements, with states’ support. And a larger share is relying on private employment agencies. Some Russian construction and logistics companies also mediate recruitment to place Central Asian migrants in countries such as Serbia and Turkey, or individuals use firms managed by Russian-speaking intermediaries to apply for pathways such as the UK Seasonal Worker Scheme.

Even as new migration corridors are opening opportunities for workers, they have also exposed migrants to exploitation by recruiters and employers. Recruiters often act as gatekeepers, charging substantial fees while failing to advocate for workers' safety or rights. Protecting migrants is partly the responsibility of origin-country governments, yet the opening of new channels has led some states to focus more on redirecting flows than on regulating the recruitment practices that generate harm.

In Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, legislative efforts to govern labor migration are underway, shaped significantly by conditions and demands in destination countries. These processes are not straightforward: Migration beyond Russia represents a relatively new and still-evolving policy area for Central Asian countries, and the legislative responses reflect this. They are iterative, often contested, and not yet fully consolidated.

In Kyrgyzstan, the number of private employment agencies has grown significantly alongside expanding government oversight, and the 2025 launch of the Electronic Consul system extended emigrants' access to diplomatic support. In Tajikistan, a parliamentary working group was set up in 2026 to draft a new migration law and legislation on private employment agencies, building on discussions ongoing since the late 2010s. Uzbekistan established its migration agency in 2024, and its draft Law on External Labor Migration has been under parliamentary review since 2021.

The article shows how Central Asia’s informal migration networks to Russia are being replaced by formalized but nonetheless often risky intermediaries and recruitment processes leading to the United Kingdom, the European Schengen countries, and the Western Balkans.

Shifts in Destinations for Labor Migrants

Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the terrorist attack in Moscow, Central Asian migrants in Russia have received unprecedented levels of scrutiny and enforcement targeting. Widespread detentions of migrants at borders and airports, lengthy interrogations, and militarized enforcement operations in workplaces, homes, and elsewhere have become systemic. Critics have documented much of the treatment as inhumane and unlawful. Temporary entry bans ranging from three to ten years—and in some cases permanent bans—have become increasingly common, often without explanation or real avenues for appeal. As a longstanding anchor for Central Asian migration, Russia still attracts workers for construction, manufacturing, and platform-based gig work with minimal upfront expenses. But for the first time, Central Asian governments have openly recognized migration to Russia as unsafe and urged citizens to refrain from travel during crises.

Administrative restrictions, entry bans, and enforcement seem to have reduced migration to Russia (see Figure 1). Central Asian migrants have decided either to migrate elsewhere or return to their home country. Yet remigration to another country remains an option for Central Asians who have access to information, recruitment networks, and financial resources to afford the travel, though for most Central Asian labor migrants, Russia has remained the only viable option despite the growing risks. Multiple generations of family members have settled in Russia, making it their permanent home rather than simply a destination for temporary labor migration.

Figure 1. Entries of Central Asian Migrants into Russia, by Origin Country, 2019-25*

* Data for 2025 cover the first nine months of the year.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data that has since been removed from the website of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service “Численность и миграция населения Российской Федерации,” available online.

At the same time, the number of destinations and recruitment schemes has expanded beyond Russia. The United Kingdom’s Seasonal Worker Scheme, relaunched in 2019, is one notable example. While small in scale compared to the options in Russia, it became a significant channel for Central Asian workers after 2022, when recruitment reoriented away from Ukraine and Russia (which had previously dominated the scheme) to Central Asia. In 2024, more than 78 percent of all 35,600 Tier 5 seasonal visas were issued to citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kazakhstan (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. UK Seasonal Worker Scheme Visas Issued, by Recipients’ Nationality, 2019-25*

* Data for 2025 are as of September.
Source: UK Home Office, “Immigration System Statistics: Entry Clearance Visas – Summary Tables,” February 26, 2026, available online.

Meanwhile, the number of EU employment permits issued to Central Asians tripled between 2021 and 2024, to nearly 79,000 (see Figure 3). Lithuania and Poland emerged as the largest new destinations for Central Asians headed to Europe, followed by Germany, Croatia, and Finland. Notably, this aggregate growth conceals uneven trajectories: the number of permits to Tajiks grew sixfold and those to Kyrgyz migrants nearly quadrupled, compared to a doubling for Kazakh nationals.

Figure 3. Valid Residence Permits for Employment Reasons in EU Member States, by Recipients’ Country of Citizenship, 2021-24

Note: Figure includes initial residence permits and renewals.
Source: Eurostat, “All Valid Permits by Reason, Length of Validity, and Citizenship on 31 December of Each Year,” accessed September 2025, available online.

Lithuania stands out as a central hub, with permits for Tajik workers increasing 23-fold between 2021 and 2024, while those for other Central Asians increased at least fivefold (see Figure 4). Germany also concluded a bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan, which contributed to a more than doubling of permits. This agreement was accompanied by discussions about using Uzbekistan as a transit country for deportations of third-country nationals, including Afghans.

Figure 4. Valid Residence Permits for Employment in Lithuania, Poland, and Germany, by Migrant’s Country of Citizenship, 2021 and 2024

Note: Figure includes initial residence permits and renewals.
Source: Eurostat, “All Valid Permits by Reason, Length of Validity, and Citizenship on 31 December of Each Year.”

The Western Balkans, particularly Serbia, have become an emerging migration corridor for Central Asian laborers looking beyond traditional European destinations. Steadily, Central Asians are joining the largest groups of immigrants in Serbia, where the expanding economy and new infrastructure projects have increased demand for foreign skilled and semi‑skilled labor, often facilitated by long‑stay (Type D) visas. Legal reforms, including the introduction of streamlined residence and work permits, have further supported temporary labor migration from Central Asia. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan do not need a visa to enter Serbia for short stays of up to 90 days within 180 days, however those intending to work, study, or remain longer for other reasons must obtain the appropriate visa or residence permit.

These shifts mark the emergence of Central Asia as a labor-sending region that is increasingly integrated into global migration corridors, which often feature highly unequal power relations between sending and receiving states. Central Asian workers are increasingly recruited because destination countries face persistent shortages of affordable yet skilled labor. This underlying demand has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine; many young Ukrainian men who might otherwise have become migrant workers in the European Union have instead been called to war. More than 20 governments have signed bilateral labor migration agreements with Central Asian countries and many have sought to ease legal pathways for temporary labor migration to secure a stable workforce for key sectors such as care, transport, and manufacturing.

Legal Pathways, the Recruitment Process, and Roles

The key question now is how migrants access these new labor markets. Unlike with Russia, where longstanding ties, informal networks, visa-free travel, and dual citizenship agreements (in the case of Tajikistan) or membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (in the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) ensured relatively easy legal entry, new destinations require formal recruitment procedures, contracts, and visas. Although these new formal systems may be advantageous in many ways, state institutions and private recruiters have become crucial to shaping access. Their role is complex: While opening new legal channels, they also bring high costs, limited regulatory oversight, and new vulnerabilities for migrants.

In practice, Central Asian migrants use three main trajectories to go to new destinations: intergovernmental agreements and organized recruitment through state employment agencies (used by a smaller number of migrants); private recruitment agencies, often working in cooperation with foreign employers or agencies; and personal networks, which are constrained by asymmetric online information, visa requirements, and bureaucratic procedures that migrants cannot address on their own. Other channels exist—including au pair programs, Germany’s Ausbildung vocational training scheme, and educational migration—but this article focuses on the first two trajectories, which are the main avenues targeted by policymakers and migrants.

In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, international recruitment is a licensed activity, while in Kyrgyzstan it is formally authorized under a permit-based system. However, recruitment also increasingly takes place through foreign-based online platforms and intermediaries operating across borders. Meanwhile unlicensed work abroad, “tourist” recruitment, hidden commissions, and other informal practices can result in fines, license revocation, or even criminal charges. Kazakhstan stands out as an exception: Its private recruiter market is underdeveloped and a significant share of labor migration occurs outside agencies, including directly by employers, through personal networks, and via tourism intermediaries. Meanwhile, existing private agencies operate in a comparatively weakly regulated Kazakh environment; licensing requirements have historically been absent or limited and only more recently has the government considered them.

Kyrgyzstan has experienced the fastest growth in private recruitment. As of 2025, there were around 197 licensed agencies, cooperating with more than 28 countries. Agencies face oversight instruments through a dedicated migration authority, official registries of authorized agencies, monitoring mechanisms, mandatory reporting, financial guarantee requirements, and other conditions.

Neighboring Uzbekistan has moved from a highly controlled state recruitment model to one in which private agencies are licensed to assist with recruitment abroad. The Migration Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers now performs key functions including licensing companies, maintaining official registries, and digital monitoring through the platform Xorijda ish (“work abroad” in Uzbek). Regulatory acts adopted in 2024 and 2025 raised compliance requirements for agencies, including by requiring workers to undergo predeparture training and enhancing contractual safeguards, introduced additional sanctions and mechanisms for the recruitment companies to cover potential deportation costs, and reinforced oversight of overseas employment channels. Even as regulations have tightened, the number of licensed private recruitment agencies grew from eight in 2019 to 50 in 2026.

Tajikistan, where the number of licensed recruiters has fluctuated between 15 and 30 over the past three years, has the weakest institutional framework. The government does not have a regulatory system or measures to support and promote formal recruitment abroad, nor does it maintain a public registry of licensed agencies or blacklists.. Legislation remains fragmented, leaving gaps in oversight. As a result, migrants' trust in official channels is low and the market for private recruitment is narrow. Still, the government regularly files criminal cases against intermediaries and agencies.

In all three of these countries, migrants continue to pay recruitment fees, either directly or through bundled service packages that may involve costs for language training, medical exams, and visa processing. This increases migrants’ expenses, debt burdens, and dependency on agencies. Kyrgyzstan saw debates around its November 2025 ratification of the International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 181, which allows for private employment agencies while protecting workers. The union of private recruitment agencies argued the convention was premature and instead advocated for retaining workers’ fees due to “competitive conditions” and employers’ reluctance to cover recruitment costs. The convention is expected to enter into force in November 2026, obliging national laws to comply with the convention and eventually preventing recruitment agencies from charging workers.

The high cost of legal recruitment in new destinations, limited state-driven program quotas, lengthy procedures, and employer-tied schemes push some migrants to travel to or work in destination countries without authorization. For example, Central Asians who secure permits in one EU country may move onward within the bloc to seek work, potentially after experiencing exploitation or abuse. Destination countries have introduced restrictions to combat this movement. In 2025, Lithuania closed its visa center in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital, and annulled around 1,400 residence permits for Tajikistani citizens on the grounds of secondary movements within the European Union.

Labor Exploitation and Migrant Workers’ Harm

Diversification is occurring through multiple pathways, but not all of them provide safe or rights-based channels for migrants. As a result, even as new routes emerge, some Central Asian workers continue to face vulnerabilities in their destinations.

In Russia, migrants increasingly face racialization, legal precarity, and growing risks of detention, deportation, or forced conscription into the war in Ukraine. By contrast, destinations in the Europe Union, South Korea, or the Western Balkans promise higher wages, but traveling there through legal channels requires going through an agency, paying high fees, and waiting for long periods. These destinations typically also offer limited protections once migrants arrive: While many legal protections may be formally stronger than those in Russia, in practice many Central Asian migrants are unable to access them due to language barriers, weak consular support, and lack of familiarity.

For instance, many Kyrgyz migrants in Belgrade have described Serbia as safer than Russia. However, they nonetheless risk being exploited and having wages withheld. Local nongovernmental organizations note that these migrants frequently work in precarious, low-paid sectors such as construction and maintenance, where labor rights enforcement is minimal and legal status is often unresolved.

The growing formalization of channels does not guarantee the protection of rights. On the contrary, it often increases migrants’ dependence on intermediaries and employers. Lithuania illustrates these dynamics: In early 2024, approximately 16,400 Central Asian migrants worked in the transport and logistics sector, including as truck drivers. Although promised high wages, many migrants had their wages delayed or simply unpaid. Some also faced arbitrary fines from their employers, spent months living in truck cabins without basic facilities, were pressured to falsify truck instrument readings, and threatened with deportation if they complained. Criminal investigations have confirmed the systemic nature: In 2025, Lithuanian prosecutors launched cases against several transport companies, with more than 30 migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan recognized as victims of labor exploitation.  

Similar dynamics are visible with the United Kingdom’s Seasonal Worker Scheme. Migrants in this program have faced exploitation, advocates claim, despite formal regulations, agreements between UK regulators and Central Asian authorities, and contracts that stipulate decent conditions such as hourly wages, housing, and paid breaks. The authors, for instance, have worked with a group of Tajikistani farmworkers who reported hidden productivity requirements, threats of dismissal for underperformance, and disciplinary practices that were not outlined in their contracts. The official complaints channel was perceived as ineffective, and migrants feared using it would mean they would be denied future visas and employment opportunities. Similar issues have been raised by groups in the United Kingdom and EU Member States. When authorities take action, recruitment agencies are either fined or coerced into closing, yet firms may later open new offices and continue recruitment.

At the same time, there is evidence of emerging adaptive strategies among migrants themselves. Over the past two years, disputes have increased in the Netherlands involving Central Asian drivers who refuse to work as a means of recovering unpaid wages from their Lithuanian employers. This points to the development of a learned coping strategy, whereby migrants rely on the anticipated support of trade unions, which in practice provide assistance in such cases. In one 2026 example, an employer sought to claim damages from a worker for retaining a truck, however a Dutch court ruled in favor of the migrant who claimed to be acting in response to unpaid wages.

These cases highlight that the expansion of legal channels does not necessarily eliminate hazards. Instead, visa dependency, employer-tied contracts, language barriers, and weak consular oversight reproduce risks that echo those some migrants face in Russia, although on a lesser scale. Moreover, Central Asian workers often lack strong diaspora networks or in some cases the opportunity to join labor unions in their new destination countries, leaving them more dependent on recruiters and employers.

Beyond Diversification

Central Asian migrants are increasingly finding work across a broader range of countries and sectors, from agriculture and construction to delivery services and textile production. Still, exploitation does not disappear with diversification; it simply shifts into new settings, where different actors profit from the same structural vulnerabilities.

Many migrants are still adjusting to the shift from informal migration networks to more formal state- or privately run recruitment systems. It has been a steep learning curve.

Recruitment agencies, in particular, act as powerful gatekeepers that profit from placing workers abroad yet often fail to ensure their safety or protect their rights. Legal channels remain narrow and often reproduce vulnerabilities under the appearance of regulation. Future research and policy efforts might pay closer attention to the role of recruitment agencies, especially on improving oversight; transparency around contracts, fees, and working conditions; and addressing the uneven distribution of responsibility between origin and destination countries. Strengthening consular support and rights-based protections abroad also remains essential, especially as individuals continue to navigate complex migration systems.

New migration corridors have offered only a partial solution to the challenges Central Asian migrants face. Without stronger protections and greater accountability from both recruiters and states, migrant workers remain exposed to exploitation at multiple points along their journeys.

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